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Introduction 
 
This is a very draft version (or extended abstract) of the report "The random-
lottery incentive system.  Can  p~1  experiments deductions be correct?".  It is 
published to extend the abstract of the report and to facilitate its perception.   
This is a part of the whole research.  The research was motivated by the 
paradoxes of the utility and prospect theories.  The analysis of such paradoxes was 
started in 1738 by Bernoulli in [1].  Examples of these paradoxes include the Allais 
paradox [2], the Ellsberg paradox [3], the "four-fold pattern" paradox (see, e.g., 
[4]), etc.  In 2002 Kahneman received the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel for research in this field.  In 2006, Kahneman and Thaler [5] 
pointed out that preferences inconsistencies in the paradoxes have still not been 
adequately overcome.   
One possible way to solve the paradoxes of utility and prospect theories was 
widely discussed, e.g., in [6]-[8].  The essence of this way consists in a proper 
attention to noise, imprecision, and other reasons that might cause dispersion, 
scattering, or spread of the data. 
The second possible way (see [9]) is to consider the zones near the boundaries 
of the probability scale, e.g. at  p~1.   
The research (see, e.g., [10]-[18]) partially presented in this article combines 
these two ways.  That is, it considers a dispersion of the data near the boundaries (or 
influence of a dispersion of the data near the boundaries).   
Simple considerations of the research have an applied mathematical character 
but a significant practical importance.  The ultimate aims are to provide pure 
mathematical support both for works that are based on the dispersion of data and for 
works those consider the zones near the boundaries of the probability scale.   
 
 
1.  The Aczél-Luce question 
1.1.  The question 
 
Aczél and Luce [9] emphasized a fundamental question: whether  W(1)=1  
(whether the Prelec weighting function is equal to  1  at  p=1).  From now on, we 
refer to this question as the Aczél-Luce question (or Luce question).   
 
1.2.  The importance of the question 
 
The Aczél-Luce question means that the Prelec weighting function has a 
discontinuity near  p=1.  This is not quantitative but a topological feature.  One of 
possible answers to the question can cardinally change the situation in the utility 
and prospect theories.   
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2.  Purely mathematical restrictions 
 
The research, partially presented in this article, considers a dispersion of the 
data near the boundaries (or influence of a dispersion of the data near the 
boundaries).  This has been expressed in a form of a sequence of lemmas and 
theorems (more detailed see below in the Appendices). 
 
2.1.  The theorem 
 
A purely mathematical theorem proves  W(1)<1.   
The theorem is based on a sequence of lemmas and theorems (more detailed 
see below in the Appendices):   
For a finite non-negative function on a finite interval, the analog of the 
dispersion is proved to tend to  0,  when the mean of the function tends to a 
boundary of the interval.  Hence, if the analog of the dispersion is not less than a 
non-zero value, then the non-zero restrictions exist on the mean.  Namely, the mean 
cannot be closer to a boundary of the interval than by another non-zero value.   
As far as the probability estimation corresponds to such a function and a non-
zero dispersion of data takes place, then the non-zero restrictions exist on the 
probability estimation.   
As far as the probability is the limit of the probability estimation and a non-
zero minimal dispersion of data takes place, then the non-zero restrictions exist on 
the probability.  Namely, the probability cannot be closer, than by the non-zero 
value, to a boundary of the probability scale.   
If there is a non-zero restriction on the probability at  p=1,  then  W(1)<1.   
As a matter of fact, the non-zero minimal dispersion of data can be caused, 
e.g., by non-zero noises.   
 
2.2.  Experimental evidence.  A seemed contradiction 
 
At present, the experiments at  p~1  seem to not support or disprove the 
theorem.  Nevertheless, fine details of the experiments should be analyzed.   
 
 
3.  Analysis of fine details of the experiments.   
 
Let us analyze the experiments.  To analyze fine details, let us confine 
ourselves to gain at high probabilities.   
The journals QJE, Econometrica, AER, JEL and JEP have been analyzed for 
the period 2003-2013.   
Let us  consider some typical descriptions (here only two) of the experiments.  
In [19] at page 1402 we see  "At the beginning of the experiment, stakeholders 
were told that the computer would randomly choose one of the situations and one of 
the choices in this situation to determine their final outcome." 
In [20] at page 3365 we see  "One choice for each subject was selected for 
payment by drawing a numbered card at random." 
We see that subjects are stimulated and paid by the choice of one from a 
number of situations.  Let us consider this feature more closely.  
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4.  Certainty and lottery.   
Correctness of data interpretation 
 
First, let us note that the stimulation by the payment for the choice of one 
from a number of situations may be named as the uncertain stimulation.  We may 
name it also as the stimulation by uncertain incentives.   
 
4.1.  Inconsistency between the certain outcomes  
and uncertain incentives 
 
Suppose, that the subjects choose the uncertain choice, that is the choice, 
which probability is strictly less than  1  (and strictly more than  0).  In this case, the 
choice and the incentive are of the same type.  
Suppose, that the subjects choose the certain choice, that is the choice, which 
probability is strictly equal to  1  (or strictly equal to  0).  In this case, the choice and 
the incentive are of different types.  Moreover, this uncertain incentive calls the 
certain outcome into question.   
 
4.2.  The role of incentives 
 
Do incentives affect the choice of the subjects?   
The correct answer to this question needs a special research.   
However, we may be sure, that if incentives would not have any influence on 
the choice of the subjects, then there would no reason to use such incentives.   
Indeed, in [20] at page 3365 we see  "Subjects were told to treat each decision 
as if it were to determine their payments." 
So, we cannot exclude that an incentive affects a choice of a subject, at least 
partially.   
So, the correctness of the use of uncertain incentives for certain outcomes is 
questionable.  We may name this problem as a "certain-uncertain" inconsistency.   
 
 
5.  The random-lottery incentive system 
 
In [20] at page 3365 we see  "This random-lottery mechanism, which is 
widely used in experimental economics, …" 
In [21] we see:   
"… the random-lottery incentive system has become the almost exclusively 
used incentive system for individual choice, and numerous studies have used and 
tested it. It is used by people well recognized in experimental economics".  
"In the random-lottery incentive system, a subject is asked to choose in 
several choice situations. At the end, a random procedure selects only one of those 
several situations to be played for real. The other situations are not played for real. 
…" 
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"Holt (1986) described a problem for the random-lottery incentive system that 
might arise theoretically. Subjects may not perceive every choice situation as 
isolated, but may perceive their situation as a grand meta-lottery over many choice 
situations …  … Starmer & Sugden (1991) were the first to empirically test whether 
the problem pointed out by Holt arises in experiments. It did not in their study. 
Subjects treated every choice situation as isolated and did not treat them as a grand 
meta-lottery." 
 
So, we may conclude:  
1)  The random-lottery incentive system is widespread in the utility and 
prospect theories.  Moreover there are no widespread mentions about differences 
between the results of the random-lottery incentive system and other systems.   
2)  The essence of the random-lottery incentive system does correspond to the 
name of the system.   
3)  The question of considering an isolated situation as a grand meta-lottery 
over many choice situations has been already brought up. Nevertheless, the specific 
"certain-uncertain" inconsistency question has not been considered.   
 
 
6.  The importance of the correctness of deductions 
 
In any case, the correctness of the interpretation and deductions is important.  
So, the evident "certain-uncertain" inconsistency should be eliminated.   
In any case, the Aczél-Luce question is important also.  In the case if, due to 
the theorem,  W(1)<1,  then a lot of results and even concepts of the utility and 
prospect theories may be modified or changed.  
 
 
7.  About the present situation  
and possible measures to attain correct deductions 
 
Possible measures to attain correct deductions should be elaborated by teams 
of researchers.  At present, one may suppose the following situation and possible 
measures to attain correct deductions: 
In the middle of the probability scale, the deductions may be the same or 
slightly corrected.   
When the probability tends to the restriction  p1-rRand-Lott  due to non-zero 
dispersion of the random-lottery of the incentive system, then the results are 
affected by non-linear functions, e.g., power and exponential ones.  So, to be 
correct, the deductions should be recalculated by the inverse functions.   
At the probabilities those are in the forbidden zone  p≥1-rRand-Lott,  a new 
approach needs to make the deductions correct.   
The situation at  p~0  is the same but (due to the first consequence of the 
hypothesis of uncertain future) is shifted to  p=0  and inversed, that is, when at  p~1  
the results are lower than the line  W(p)=p,  then at  p~0  the results are higher than 
the line  W(p)=p.   
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Conclusions 
 
Aczél and Luce (2007) emphasized a fundamental question:  whether  W(1)=1  
(whether the Prelec weighting function equals  1  at  p=1).   
A purely mathematical theorem proves  W(1)<1.   
The experiments at  p~1  seem to disprove the theorem.   
 
However, in the prevailing random-lottery incentive system, the choices of 
certain outcomes are stimulated by uncertain lotteries.   
Because of this evident "certain-uncertain" inconsistency, the deductions from 
the random-lottery incentive experiments, those include the certain outcomes, 
cannot be unquestionably correct.  So, these deductions need an additional proof, or 
an amendment, or a new approach.   
 
At that, they may need different measures for different  p.  Namely:  
In the middle of the probability scale, the deductions may be the same or 
slightly corrected.   
When the probability tends to the restriction  p1-rRand-Lott  the deductions 
should be recalculated by non-linear functions, e.g., by functions those are inverse 
to power and exponential ones.  
At the probabilities those are in the forbidden zone  p≥1-rRand-Lott,  a new 
approach needs to make the deductions correct.   
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Appendices (see [13], [14], [22]) 
A1.  An illustrative example of restrictions for mean 
A.1.1.  Two points 
 
Let us suppose given an interval  [A, B]  (see Figure 1).  Let us suppose that 
two points are determined on this interval:   a left point  xLeft  and a right point     
xRight : xLeft<xRight.  The coordinates of the middle, mean point may be calculated as  
M=(xLeft+xRight)/2.   
 
Figure 1. An interval  [A, B].  Left  xLeft,  right  xRight   
and middle,  mean  M  points on it 
 
Let us suppose that  xRight-xLeft≥2σ=2Constσ>0.  So, of course,  xRight≥xLeft+2σ  
and  xLeft≤xRight-2σ.   For the sake of simplicity,  Figures 1-3 represent the case of the 
equality  xRight-xLeft=2σ  and also, of course,  xRight=xLeft+2σ,    xLeft=xRight-2σ  and  
M-xLeft=xRight-M=σ=Constσ>0.   
So,  M=xLeft+σ>xLeft  and  M=xRight-σ<xRight.   
Suppose further that  xLeft≥A  and  xRight≤B.   
One can easily see that two types of zones for  M  can exist in the interval:   
1)  The mean point  M  can be located only in the zone which will be referred 
to as "allowed" (see Figure 2).   
2)  The mean point  M  cannot be located in the zones which will be referred 
to as "forbidden" (see Figure 3).   
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A.1.2.  Allowed zone 
 
Due to the conditions of the example, the left point  xLeft  may not be located 
further left than the left border of the interval  xLeft≥A  and the right point  xRight  may 
not be located further right than the right border of the interval  xRight≤B.   
For  M,  we have  M=xLeft+σ≥A+σ>A  and  M=xRight-σ≤B-σ<B  (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2. Allowed zone for  M 
 
The width of the allowed zone for  M  is equal to   
σσσ 2)()( −−=+−− ABAB .   
It is less than the width  (B-A)  of the total interval  [A, B]  by 2σ.  Also, the allowed 
zone is a proper subset of the total interval.   
If the distance  2σ  between the left  xLeft  and right  xRight  points is non-zero, 
then the difference between the width of the allowed zone and the width of the 
interval is non-zero also.  If the distance is greater than 2σ, then the difference is 
greater than 2σ  also.   
 
So, the mean point  M  can be located only in the allowed zone of the interval.   
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A.1.3.  Restrictions, forbidden zones 
 
Let us define the term "restriction" for the purposes of this article:   
Definition.  A restriction (more exactly, a restriction on the mean) signifies 
the impossibility for the mean to be located closer to a border of the interval than 
some fixed distance.  In other words, a restriction implies here a forbidden zone for 
the mean near a border of the interval.   
The value of a restriction or the width of a forbidden zone signifies the 
minimal possible distance between the mean and a border of the interval.  For 
brevity, the term "the value of a restriction" may be shortened to "restriction." 
 
If  A≤xLeft,  xRight≤B  and  xRight-xLeft=2σ,  then restrictions, forbidden zones 
with the width of one sigma  σ  exist between the mean point and the borders of the 
interval (see Figure 3).  So there are two forbidden zones, located near the borders 
of the interval.  The mean point M can not be located in these forbidden zones.   
 
Figure 3. Forbidden zones, restrictions on  M 
 
The restrictions, the forbidden zones are shown by two dotted lines and by 
painting in the bottom part of Figure 3.   
As we can easily see, restrictions on the mean or forbidden zones exist 
between the allowed zone of the mean  M  and the borders  A  and  B  of the interval  
[A; B]. The value of the restriction, or, equivalently, the width of the forbidden 
zone, is equal to  σ.   
 
So, the restrictions of the value  σ  on the mean point  M  exist near the 
borders of the interval 
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A2.  An illustrative example of restrictions for probability 
 
Consider a classical example: an aiming firing at a target. 
Suppose a round target (Figure 4) of the diameter  2L.  
 
Figure 4. Target for firing 
 
For the obviousness suppose (Figure 5) the dispersion of hits is uniformly 
distributed in a zone of the diameter  2σ  (See an example of the normal 
distribution, e.g., in [23]). 
 
Figure 5. Dispersion of hits is uniformly distributed  
in a zone of the diameter 2σ 
Notes about this figure:  
Note 1: This is only a simplified example (See an example of the normal 
distribution, e.g., in [23]).  
Note 2: The case 1) represents the case of small diameter 2σSmall of the zone of 
dispersion of hits.  
The case 2) represents the case of large diameter 2σLarge of the zone of dispersion of 
hits.  
Suppose the point of aiming may be varied between the center of the target 
and a point which is outside the target. 
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The case, when the diameter 2σSmall of the zone of dispersion of hits is 
considerably less than the diameter 2L of the target, is drawn on the figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Firing for the small dispersion of hits 
Note: The diameter 2σSmall of the zone of dispersion of hits is considerably less than 
the diameter 2L of a target. 
 
At the condition of the small dispersion of hits, the maximum possible 
probability of hit in the target can be equal to 1 (can reach the boundary of the 
probability scale). 
When the point of aiming is varied between the center of the target and a point 
which is outside the target, the probability of hit in the target is varied from 1 to 0. 
There are no restrictions in the probability scale. 
 
The case, when the diameter 2σLarge of the zone of dispersion of hits is 
considerably more than the diameter 2L of the target, is drawn on the figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Firing for the large dispersion of hits 
 
13 
 
 
Note: The diameter 2σLarge of the zone of dispersion of hits is considerably more 
than the diameter 2L of the target. 
 
At the condition of the large dispersion of hits (exactly speaking at the 
condition the diameter 2σLarge of the zone of dispersion of hits is more than the 
diameter 2L of a target), the maximum possible probability of hit in the target can 
not be equal to 1. 
 
So, the situatiuon for the probability for this case is drawn on the figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Restriction for the probability: Allowed zone and forbidden zone 
Note: See the example of two restrictions for two boundaries in [24]). 
 
The value PAllowedMax of the maximal allowed probability of the allowed zone 
[0, PAllowedMax] may be estimated as the ratio of the mean number of the hits in the 
target to the total number of the hits. In this particular case, when the distribution of 
hits is supposed to be uniform, this ratio equals to the ratio of the area of hits 
scattering to the area of the target 
eLeLeHitsLetTAllowedMax LLSSP arg
22
arg
22
argarg /// σπσπ ===  .  
If 
eLL argσ<  ,  
then 
1<AllowedMaxP  .  
 
In this particular case, the probabilities of hit in the target, that are larger than 
PAllowedMax, are impossible. The allowed probabilities of hit in the target belong to 
the allowed zone [0, PAllowedMax]. 
The value of the restriction RRestriction may be estimated as the difference 
between unit and the maximal allowed probability PAllowedMax of hit in the target 
01Re >−= AllowedMaxstriction PR  ,  
and, if L<σLarge, then RRestriction is a positive nonzero quantity. At the conditions of 
the figure 7, it is evident the probability PAllowedMax can not be more, then 0.5-0.7 
(50%-70%) and the restriction RRestriction is as more as 0.3-0.5 (30%-50%). 
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A3.  Theorems of existence of restrictions 
A.3.1.  Preliminary notes 
 
Let us suppose given a finite interval,  X=[A, B] : 0<ConstAB≤(B-A)<∞,  a set 
of points  {xk} : k=1, 2, … K : 2≤K≤∞,  and a finite non-negative function  fK(xk)  
such that for  xk<A  and  xk>B  the statement  fK(xk)≡0  is true; for  A≤xk≤B  the 
statement  0≤fK(xk)< ∞  is true, and   
K
K
k
kK Wxf =∑
=1
)(  ,  
where  WK  (the total weight of  fK(xk))  is  a constant such that   
∞<< KW0  .  
Without loss of generality, the function  fK(xk)  may be normalized so that  WK=1.   
 
Definition 1.1.  Let us define an analog of the moment of  n-th  order of the 
function  fK(xk)  relative to a point  x0:   
∑∑
==
−=−=−
K
k
kK
n
k
K
k
kK
n
k
K
n xfxxxfxx
W
XXE
1
0
1
00 )()()()(
1)(  .  
From now on, for brevity, we refer to this analog of the moment of  n-th  order as 
simply the moment of  n-th  order.   
 
Let us suppose the mean  M≡E(X)  of the function  fK(xk)  exists   
Mxfxxfx
W
XE
K
k
kKk
K
k
kKk
K
≡=≡ ∑∑
== 11
)()(1)(  .  
Let us suppose at least one central moment  E(X-M)n : 2≤n<∞,  of the function  
fK(xk)  exists  
∑∑
==
−=−=−
K
k
kK
n
k
K
k
kK
n
k
K
n xfMxxfMx
W
MXE
11
)()()()(1)(  .  
 
One may prove (see, e.g., [22]), that a function, which attains the maximal 
possible central moment, is concentrated at the borders of the interval.  At that, the 
moduli of the central moments of such a function are not greater than the estimate 
AB
AMMB
AB
MBAMMXEMax nnn
−
−
−+
−
−
−≤− )()(|))((|  .  
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A.3.2.  General lemma for the mean 
 
Lemma 3.2.  If, for the function  fK(xk)  defined in Section A.3.1,  M≡E(X)  
tends to  A  or to  B,  then, for  n : 2≤n<∞,  E(X-M)n  tends to  zero.   
Proof.  For  MA,  the estimate gives  
0)()(2
))((])()[(
))((])()[(
)()(|)(|
1
11
11
 →−−≤
≤
−
−−
−+−<
<
−
−−
−+−=
=
−
−
−+
−
−
−≤−
→
−
−−
−−
AM
n
nn
nn
nnn
AMAB
AB
MBAMABAB
AB
MBAMMBAM
AB
AMMB
AB
MBAMMXE
 .  
This rough estimate is already sufficient for the purpose of this article.  But a more 
precise estimate may be obtained:   
0)()(|)(| 1  →−−≤− →
−
AM
nn AMABMXE  .  
For  MB,  the proof is similar and gives   
0)()(|)(| 1  →−−≤− →
−
BM
nn MBABMXE  .  
So, if  (B-A)  and  n  are finite and  MA  or  MB,  then  E(X-M)n0.   
 
 
A.3.3.  General theorem for the mean 
 
Let us define two terms for the purposes of this article:   
Definition 3.3.1.  A restriction on the mean  rMean  (or, simply, a restriction) 
signifies the impossibility for the mean to be located closer to a border of the 
interval than some fixed distance.  In other words, a restriction implies here a 
forbidden zone for the mean near a border of the interval.   
The value of a restriction or the width of a forbidden zone signifies the 
minimal possible distance between the mean and a border of the interval.  For 
brevity, the term "the value of a restriction" may be shortened to "restriction." 
Definition 3.3.2.  Let us define "restriction on dispersion of the  n-th  order"  
rnDispersion.n≡rnDisp.n : rDisp.n>0  (where dispersion is taken in the broad sense, as 
scattering, spread, variation, etc.) to be the minimal absolute value of the analog of 
the  n-th  order central moment  E(X-M)n  such that  |E(X-M)n|≥rnDisp.n>0.   
For  n=2  the restriction on the dispersion of second order is the minimal 
possible dispersion (in the particular sense)  r2Disp.2=σ2Min.   
 
 
Theorem 3.2.  If,  for the finite non-negative discrete function  fK(xk)  defined 
in Section 1,  with the mean  M≡E(X)  and the analog of an  n-th  (2≤n<∞)  order 
central moment  E(X-M)n  of the function, a non-zero restriction on dispersion of the  
n-th  order  rnDisp.n=ConstDisp.n>0 : |E(X-M)n|≥rnDisp.n,  exists, then the non-zero 
restriction  rMean>0  on the mean  E(X)  exists and  A<(A+rMean)≤M≡E(X)≤(B-
rMean)<B.   
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Proof.  From the conditions of the theorem and from the lemma for  MA,  
we have   
)()(|)(|0 1. AMABMXEr nnnDispn −−≤−≤< −    
and  
)(
)(
0 1
. AM
AB
r
n
nDisp
n
−≤
−
< −  .  
So,  
0
)(
)( 1
. >
−
≡≥− −n
nDisp
n
Mean AB
rrAM  .  
For  MB,  the proof is similar and gives   
0
)(
)( 1
. >
−
≡≥− −n
nDisp
n
Mean AB
rrMB  .  
So, as long as  (B-A)  and  n  are finite  and  rnDisp.n=ConstDisp.n>0,  then  
rMean=ConstM>0  and  A<(A+rMean)≤M≤(B-rMean)<B.   
 
Note 
 
This estimate is an ultra-reliable one.  It is, in a sense, as ultra-reliable as the 
Chebyshev inequality.  Preliminary calculations [25] which were performed for real 
cases, such as the normal, uniform and exponential distributions with the minimal 
values  σ2Min  of the analog of the dispersion (in the particular sense), gave the 
restrictions  rMean  on the mean of the function, which are not worse than   
3
Min
Meanr
σ
≥  .  
 
 
A.3.4.  Lemma for the probability estimation  
 
Lemma: If  fK(xk)  is defined as in section A3.1, and either E[X]→0 or 
E[X]→1, then, for 1<n<∞, 
0|)(| →− nMXE  .  
Proof: As long as the conditions of this lemma satisfy the conditions of the 
lemma in section A3.2, then the statement of this lemma is as true as the statement 
of the lemma in section A3.2.  
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A.3.5.  Theorem for probability estimation 
 
Theorem: If a probability estimation, frequency FK, and {xk} are defined as in 
section A3.1, such that M≡E[X]≡FK, there are n : 1<n<∞, and rdispers>0 : E[(X-
M)n]≥rdispers>0, then, for the probability estimation, frequency FK≡M≡E[X], a 
restriction rmean exists such as 0<rmean≤FK≤(1-rmean)<1. 
Proof: As long as the conditions of this theorem satisfy the conditions of the 
theorem in section A3.3, then the statement of this theorem is as true as the 
statement of the theorem in section A3.3.  
 
 
A.3.6.  Theorem for probability  
 
Theorem: If, for the probability scale [0; 1], a probability P and the 
probability estimation, frequency FK, for a series of tests of number K : K>>1, are 
determined such that when the number K of tests tends to infinity, the frequency FK 
tends at that to the probability P, that is 
K
K
FP
∞→
= lim  ,  
non-zero restrictions rmean : 0<rmean≤FK≤(1-rmean)<1 exist between the zone of the 
possible values of the frequency and every boundary of the probability scale, then 
the same non-zero restrictions rmean : 0<rmean≤P≤(1-rmean)<1 exist between the zone 
of the possible values of the probability P and every boundary of the probability 
scale. 
Proof: Consider the left boundary 0 of the probability scale [0; 1]. The 
frequency FK is not less than rmean: 
meanK rF ≥  .  
Hence, we obtain for P: 
meanmean
K
K
K
rrFP =≥=
∞→∞→
limlim  .  
So, P≥rmean. Note that this is true for both monotonous and dominated 
convergence. The reason is the fixation of the minimal value of all the FK by the 
conditions of the theorem. 
For the right boundary 1 of the probability scale the proof is similar to that 
above. 
 
 
